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1. Introduction2
 
"Why is globalization accompanied by different types of regionalism? Why does the formation 
of a world-wide civil society go hand in hand with a crisis of the nation-state as an ethical 
form of community?" These questions – raised by Seyla Benhabib in her Horkheimer 
Lectures3 – are most often answered by pointing to an inherent relationship between 
globalization and fragmentation.4 What is missing is solid empirical work that is concerned 
with identifying the causal pathways between globalization and regionalism, and tests them 
systematically using critical cases. This article aims to make a contribution to help fill this 
gap. 
Globalization can be defined as the extension of boundaries of social transactions beyond 
state borders. Even though the scope of most of these cross-border transactions is actually 
not global – which is the reason why in some contexts "societal denationalization" seems the 
more appropriate term and will be used here interchangeably with globalization5 – they still 
cause a problem for national governance simply because the social space to be governed is 
no longer national. The degree of denationalization can be operationalized as the proportion 
of cross-border transactions relative to transactions taking place within national borders. 
Social transactions are constituted by the exchange or common production of goods, 
services and capital (constituting the issue area of economy), threats (force), pollutants 
(environment), signs (communication) and persons (mobility). An empirical investigation 
using this conceptualization shows that globalization is not a uniform, but rather is an uneven 
process that varies significantly among issue areas, countries and over time. 
Denationalization has been taking place in mild forms since the 1950s, with some 
acceleration taking place in the 1970s. Significant denationalization thrusts, however, have 
occurred in a number of specific issue areas only since the second half of the 1980s, and 
have mainly occured in the OECD-countries. The most notable developments took place with 
respect to global financial markets, global environmental dangers, the Internet and organized 
crime.6
 
2 Research for this project was funded by the German Research Association (Zu-62/3). 
3 See Seyla Benhabib: Kulturelle Vielfalt und demokratische Gleichheit. Politische Partizipation im 
Zeitalter der Globalisierung (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer, 1999), 27. 
4 See for instance Ulrich Menzel: Globalisierung versus Fragmentierung (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 
1997). 
5 In course of the project, we distinguished societal denationalization, which referes to the extension 
of social spaces across national border from political denationalization. While the former is 
considered as a societal change (which has been made possible by the interplay of technology, 
national and international policies as well as value change) that creates problems of regulation, the 
latter is considered as a process of strengthening the competencies of those political institutions 
that are either above (international and supra-national) as well as below (regionalism) the level of 
traditional nation-states. With this analytical distinction we do not deny that societal and political 
denationalization are connected and that political denationalization is one possible response to the 
regulatory problems of the nation-state that are caused by societal denationalization. 
6 We developed 72 indicators to determine the extent of denationalization in different issue areas 
and different OECD countries (see Marianne Beisheim, Sabine Dreher, Gregor Walter, Bernhard 
Zangl and Michael Zürn: Im Zeitalter der Globalisierung? Thesen und Daten zur gesellschaftlichen 
und politischen Denationalisierung (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999). For a similar undertaking with 
similar results see David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton: Global 
Transformations. Politics, Economics, and Culture (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999).  
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Some regionalist movements in the OECD-world have experienced a revival parallel to 
globalization since the end of the 1980s. When the strength of regionalist movements is 
measured by popular support for regionalist goals, expressed in votes for regionalist parties 
and surveys on different constitutional options, and also by the support regionalist objectives 
receive from relevant collective actors in the political and social spheres, for instance 
business organizations and unions, then it can be stated clearly that movements in Northern 
Italy, in Catalonia, in Scotland and Wales, and in Québec gained momentum simultaneously 
with the globalization thrust. In order to find out whether this correlation between 
globalization and regionalism is due to a causal relationship we proceed in three steps. 
Section 1 identifies causal pathways through which globalization may stimulate the rise of 
regional movements. Against this background we formulate in Section 2 more specific 
hypotheses about the rise of regionalist movements in the age of globalization. Although 
these hypotheses seem to have some explanatory power about this "new regionalism", the 
movements in Scotland and in Québec are identified in section 3 as two cases which do not 
fit easily into the scheme. In section 4 a detailed analysis of the regionalist discourse in 
Scotland and Québec is carried out which allows us to reformulate our hypotheses and to 
draw some general conclusions in the final section.  
 
2. Regionalism as a Response to Globalization 
 
Regionalism generally refers to the decentralization of political powers or competencies from 
a higher towards a lower political level. More specifically, one must distinguish between "top-
down" and "bottom-up" regionalism.7 The former describes the decentralization of 
competencies or the establishment of regional institutions by the state, whereas the latter 
includes all patterns of endeavours toward political decentralization from within the particular 
region. Although globalization can also support top-down regionalism, i.e. by tempting central 
governments to decentralize responsibilities, what Anderson8 calls the "decentralization of 
penury", this contribution deals with regionalism from below. To be more precise, regionalism 
shall be treated here as the politicization of the regional political level,9 which aims to 
strengthen it politically. The goals of sub-state regionalism range from merely decentralizing 
some competencies to the establishment of a new independent state, in other words, 
separatism. 
How is "bottom-up" regionalism affected by globalization? To begin with, globalization leads 
to three broad developments that can be labelled as uneven denationalization.10 First, as a 
                                                 
7 Michael Keating, "Europeanism and Regionalism", in Barry Jones and Michael Keating (eds.), The 
European Union and the Regions (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 2. 
8 See Jeffrey J. Anderson: "Business Associations and the Decentralization of Penury: Functional 
Groups and Territorial Interests," Governance: An International Journal of Policy and 
Administration 4, No. 1, (1991). 
9 Dirk Gerdes: Regionalismus als Soziale Bewegung. Westeuropa, Frankreich, Korsika: Vom 
Vergleich zur Kontextanalyse (Frankfurt/New York: Campus, 1985), 56. 
10 For an analysis along these lines see Michael Zürn: Regieren jenseits des Nationalstaates 
(Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1998). 
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result of societal denationalization and the deregulation of markets,11 the effectiveness of 
national policies evidently decreases in those issue areas where the spatial scope of national 
regulations does not reach the boundaries of real transactions. The ability to intervene into 
markets has been reduced by the rapidly increased flexibility of capital as well as the highly 
sensitive financial markets. Nor do national defence or deterrence measures look very 
effective against new security threats from outside, no matter whether of a military, ecological 
or "cultural" nature. Second, in order to restore the effectiveness of their policies, nation-
states aim at establishing international regimes and institutions thus adjusting the scope of 
political regulations to the boundaries of social transactions. Especially in the economic 
sphere, international institutions like the international trade regime (WTO) and supranational 
integration in Europe have achieved uncontested importance. Third, as the number and the 
importance of these international institutions grow, the complexity of governance also 
increases, while the democratic control of international organizations and the development of 
transnational identities lags behind. While the bourgeois thinks and acts in global categories, 
the citoyen is still imprisoned within a national framework and needs to search for new forms 
of effective participation in political decision-making. Each of these three dimensions of 
uneven denationalization affects regionalism. 
1) Welfare Regionalism: In a denationalized economy each region aims at increasing its 
attractiveness for foreign direct investment and at increasing the productivity of its economy 
through the reduction of costs for national policies. Therefore, rich regions in countries with 
regional disparities may see an opportunity to pursue their own economic strategies without 
having to provide for the interests of other, poorer regions within that nation-state. 
Decentralization or separation can be pursued as a means to escape duties, such as 
financial redistribution, linked to being part of the nation-state. This kind of welfare 
regionalism, the most prominent example being the Lega Nord,12 is most likely to emerge in 
regions which form part of the economic core, but not the political centre of the nation-state. 
The Lega Nord promoted the image of the Italian state as too inefficient in economic terms 
and used arguments about the advantages of regionalization for the economy.13
2) Functionality of Regions: The growing ineffectiveness of national intervention into markets 
restricts the states' capacity for territorial management, which is crucial to the integration of 
peripheral regions into the national project. Territorial management includes the provision of 
benefits to the entire region, for instance, via structural and social policies. In addition, it 
means the incorporation of regional elites into the national elite system to prevent challenges 
to the established power structures.14 If the existing state is no longer able to provide such 
benefits, the incentive to remain part of it diminishes and the regionalist cleavages 
traditionally restrained by territorial management are more likely to be mobilized.  
 
11 Joachim Hirsch: "Internationale Regulation. Bedingungen von Dominanz, Abhängigkeit und 
Entwicklung im globalen Kapitalismus," Das Argument No. 198 (1993); Stephen Gill: 
"Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and Disciplinary Liberalism," Millenium: Journal of International 
Studies 24, no. 3 (1995). 
12 Oliver Schmidtke: Politics of Identity. Ethnicity, Territories, and the Political Opportunity Structure in 
Modern Italian Society (Sinzheim: Pro Universitate Verlag, 1996). 
13 Dwayne Woods: "The Centre No Longer Holds: The Rise of Regional Leagues in Italian Politics," 
West European Politics 15, no. 2 (1992), 58. 
14 See Michael Keating: State and Regional Nationalism. Territorial Politics and the European State 
(Hemel Hempsted: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1988), 18ff. 
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In addition, the advantages of small units in an integrating world market are increasingly 
being emphasized.15 Such hypotheses can also be found in political economy approaches, 
particularly, "flexible specialization",16 regulation theory17 or neo-Schumpeterian works18, and 
were popularized in the debate on a "Europe of the Regions". In the absence of macro-
economic steering and in the face of increasing competition between territorial units, that are 
not separated by borders, the following argument gains credibility: the political level that is 
closer to the problems at hand requires more power and more resources to increase the 
regional economy's competitiveness. 
3) Diminishing Risks: The rise of negative integration or market-making international 
institutions diminishes the risks for regionalism. Since one of the central tasks of the nation-
state was the establishment of a large market, the diverse regions were granted access that 
they in turn did not wish to risk losing. In the past, the fear of losing markets used to be one 
of the main obstacles to regionalist mobilization. Considering the degree of economic 
integration within the OECD and regional economic blocks such as the EU and NAFTA, the 
size of a state is no longer relevant to its economic development. 
4) Multi-level governance: The rise of international institutions could be found by individuals 
as well as collective political and social actors to be helpful in pursuing their regional 
interests. This is especially true in centralized states, where the fulfilment of regionalist goals 
means a substantial change in the established institutional structure. Such far-reaching 
changes are usually viewed with suspicion, since they imply a high degree of uncertainty. By 
contrast, the experience that multi-level governance, where responsibilities and 
competencies are shared between several political levels, works to their benefit, can change 
people's perceptions of politics, i.e. traditional understandings of sovereignty.19
The complexity of governance is also a motivation for representing region-specific interests 
on the international agenda directly instead of using the nation-state as a mediator. This 
applies to specific economic interests, but also to cultural concerns. The establishment of a 
smaller territorial unit as an actor on the international scene can also serve to suggest an 
                                                 
15 Peter J. Katzenstein: Small States in World Markets (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985). 
16 Michael J. Piore/Charles F. Sabel: Das Ende der Massenproduktion. Studie über die 
Requalifizierung der Arbeit und die Rückkehr der Ökonomie in die Gesellschaft (Frankfurt/Main: 
Fischer, 1989). 
17 See Robert Boyer :"The Eighties: The Search for Alternatives to Fordism," in Bob Jessop, Hans 
Kastendiek, Klaus Nielsen and Ove K. Pedersen (eds.), The Politics of Flexibility. Restructuring 
State and Industry in Britain, Germany and Scandinavia (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1991), 106-132; 
Alain Lipietz: Towards a New Economic Order. Postfordism, Ecology and Democracy (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1992) and Alain Lipietz: "The National and the Regional: Their Autonomy Vis-à-vis the 
Capitalist World Crisis," in Ronen P. Palan and Barry Gills eds., Transcending the State-Global 
Divide. A Neostructuralist Agenda in International Relations (Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner, 
1994). 
18 See Christopher Freeman, The Economics of Innovation (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1990); Carlotta 
Perez, "New Technologies and Development," in Christopher Freeman and Bent Ake Lundvall, 
eds., Small Countries Facing the Technological Revolution (London/New York: Pinter, 1988) and 
Christopher Freeman and Luc Soete, New Explorations in the Economics of Technical Change 
(London: Pinter, 1990). 
19 See Niels Lange, Zwischen Regionalismus und europäischer Integration. Wirtschaftsinteressen in 
regionalistischen Konflikten (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998a); Niels Lange, "Business Interests in 
Regionalist Conflicts: Changing Opportunity Structures Through European Integration?," Regional 
and Federal Studies 8, no. 3 (1998b). 
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impression of "closer proximity" to the people (Bürgernähe), helping to overcome the 
uneasiness created by the growing complexity of governance. The incentives for regionalism 
are further increased when the economic functions traditionally carried out by the nation-
state are increasingly provided by a supranational political level, that is when negative 
integration is supplemented by positive integration as in the EU. This holds especially true for 
those countries with a below-average GNP per capita and thus are major beneficiaries of 
regional and structural funds in EU. 
5) Narcissism of small differences: Societal denationalization and the rise of international 
institutions leads to an increasing complexity of governance creating fears and perceptions of 
powerlessness, particularly amongst the less educated and socially deprived sections of the 
population. Political Sociology has demonstrated that feelings of uncertainty foster the 
readiness to vote for right-wing extremist and nationalist parties. The desire for clear-cut 
units grows. In this manner, globalization can benefit nationalism at the state and the sub-
state level. Regionalism benefits from this development when it interacts with changes taking 
place within the cultural sphere. To the extent that states are no longer able to protect their 
'national culture' from external influences via media, telecommunication and travel or 
migration, they are deprived of its capacity to express or represent a common 'national' 
culture. In other words, the 'diffuse support'20 for the nation-state wanes. On the other hand, 
the need for a sense of belonging and a collective identity remains, and might even become 
stronger. Regardless of whether different cultures become more similar or not, it is the 
impression that counts. Considering all the attempts by nation-states to protect their culture 
and language, one can easily conclude that there is a widespread belief that a homogenising 
pressure on cultures exists. 
Within this context, the Freudian "narcissism of small differences" emerges and even small 
cultural differences can be revived politically. While collective identities in the end are always 
social constructions, the sense of belonging can be focused more easily on smaller entities, 
regions for example. Consequently, collective identities other than those associated with the 
existing nation-state are more likely to be mobilized. This holds particularly true in regions 
with an existing regionalist cleavage. Wherever regionalist movements emerged from the late 
1960s onwards, they were paralleled by a widespread revival of traditional regional culture, 
that is arts, both visual and performing, and literature. In many cases, regionalist movements 
were accommodated by the establishment of radio and television programs in the regional 
language. Such cultural region-building can satisfy the widespread need for (new) collective 
identities. 
In sum, the political consequences of globalization change the logic of some variables used 
to explain regionalism. It is no longer only the political actions of the nation-state that provoke 
regionalist responses, but also the undermining of some traditional functions of the nation-
state through globalization and political internationalization. In an increasingly competitive 
world market, rich regions want to rid themselves of their national commitments, while at the 
same time the development of market-enhancing international institutions has reduced the 
risks of secession and even increased the incentives to organize regionally in order to be 
eligible for resources in so far as they also include market-correcting programs. The evolving 
 
20 Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, Europe’s Would-be Polity. Patterns of Change in the 
European Community (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970). 
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complexity of governance beyond the nation-state in turn creates desires to emphasize 
cultural differences at the regional level and to represent regional interests directly, no longer 
via the nation-state. 
 
3. Hypotheses About Regionalism in the Age of Globalization 
 
How is it possible to test empirically whether or not the identified causal pathways through 
which globalization may affect regionalism are significant? One possibility is to develop 
hypotheses surrounding these causal pathways and test them in the form of a correlational 
analysis. These hypotheses state the conditions within which a strengthening of regionalist 
movements can be expected. Another possibility is to carry out an in-depth analysis of the 
actions by and the justifications employed by regionalist movements in order to find out 
whether the causal mechanisms significantly affected regionalist discourses. 
The hypotheses derived from the consideration of causal pathways beg the analysis of 
features of those nation-states in the OECD-world with strong regionalist movements in the 
age of globalization. 
1. If a state is characterized by strong regional disparities with significant regulations on 
financial transfer from the richer regions, and the richer regions are not the political centre, 
then regionalist movements can be expected to get stronger.  
2. If a state is strongly denationalized, especially in the economic and cultural spheres, that is 
with a strong exposure to foreign markets and to external cultural influences, then regionalist 
movements can be expected to get stronger. 
3. If a state is strongly involved in international institutions that create and maintain markets 
beyond the national level, then regionalist movements can be expected to get stronger. 
4. If a state is strongly involved in international institutions that distribute resources in order to 
correct market outcomes beyond the national level, then regionalist movements can be 
expected to get stronger. 
In brief, regionalism is expected to be strengthened by globalization especially in relatively 
wealthy regions that do not belong to the political centre within nation-states that are 
exposed to economic and political integration as well as the intensified exchange of 
economic and cultural goods. 
This set of hypotheses can in correlational terms explain why, for instance, regionalist 
movements did grow in importance and in strength in Italy and Great Britain, while no such 
regionalist revival can be observed in Germany and the US.21 On the one hand, both Italy 
and Great Britain are characterized by a high level of economic and cultural 
denationalization, by a marked degree of regional disparities and by a remarkable 
involvement in market-making and market-correcting international institutions. On the other 
                                                 
21 See Zürn (fn. 10), 277-283, for such an analysis with the G-7 countries as universe of cases. 
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hand, the degree of cultural denationalization in the US is minimal (because of US 
dominance on cultural markets), the degree of political autonomy of richer regions is high 
and the involvement in international institutions is less marked than in the Europe. Germany 
is closer to Italy and Britain in terms of cultural denationalization and involvement in 
international institutions, yet regional disparities have traditionally been rather weak. 
Overall, the analysis carried out so far portrays the revival of regionalism rather as the 
emergence of a new kind of regionalism. While regionalist movements in the 1960s and 
1970s developed in relatively poor regions, like Corsica and Wales, that felt discriminated 
against by the economic, cultural and politically dominant centers, the new regionalism in the 
age of globalization appears to be a form of welfare regionalism. Economically thriving 
regions that are not the political centers – the Lega Nord seems to be the ideal case – want 
to benefit from the new opportunities created by economic globalization and the rise of 
international institutions and for that reason strive for increased autonomy and a weakening 
of the centralized nation-state. 
While the above picture of the revival of regionalism helps one to understand some of the 
ongoing developments, its explanatory power is still limited. Although it is true that some 
forms of regionalism in the economic periphery of OECD countries, in Corsica, in Brittany, in 
Northern Scandinavia etc., have lost momentum, while welfare regionalism in Northern Italy, 
Catalonia, Flanders and some East European countries has emerged or increased, there are 
cases that do not fit into this picture. For instance, the case of Galicia is a clear case of 
peripheral regionalism that has gained new momentum over the last two decades.22 
Moreover, regional movements in Scotland and Québec, although they are no cases of 
peripheral regionalism, can hardly be categorized as blunt cases of welfare regionalism 
either. They seem to constitute in-between cases. Nonetheless, they clearly experienced a 
re-strengthening of a traditionally strong regionalist movement. It seems especially worthy to 
take a closer look at these cases in order to refine the the hypotheses on regionalism in the 
age of globalization. 
 
4. The Revival of Regionalism in Scotland and Québec 
 
In the remainder of this paper, we wish to carry out an in-depth analysis of the actions and 
justifications of regionalist movements in Scotland and Québec before and after the current 
thrust of globalization since the 1980s. Scotland and Québec are two regions with long-
standing regionally distinct national identities. Both are located within OECD states which are 
subject to a high level of economic and cultural denationalization and also have a strong 
level of involvement in international institutions. Moreover, both countries display relatively 
strong regional disparities. Although the revival of these regionalist movements can thus be 
(at least partially) explained by the above hypotheses about the states' characteristics which 
induce regionalist challenges, the characters of the regionalist movements themselves are 
 
22 Ramon Maíz and Antón Losada, Institutions, Political Autonomy and Nation Building: The Galician 
Case in Spain and Europe, 1988-1998, Paper presented at the ECPR joint sessions of workshops, 
Mannheim, (1999). 
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hardly compatible with the respective portrayal of "new" regionalism. The question therefore 
is whether the causal mechanisms identified in Section 1 nevertheless play a role in these 
regionalist discourses and how the initial portrayal of the new type of regionalism is to be 
adapted. 
Although much can and should be said about (regional) nationalism23 in Scotland and 
Québec, for example regarding its sources and developments, we shall restrict ourselves to 
some very basic indicators here. There is no doubt that in both cases regionalist tendencies 
have become stronger over the last decade. Like other regions in the Western world, 
Scotland and Québec have experienced two waves of regionalism, one from the late sixties 
until the late seventies and one in the late eighties/early nineties. The respective nationalist 
parties, the Scottish National Party (SNP) and the Parti Québécois (PQ), gained electoral 
support in the early seventies. The SNP reached an electoral peak with 30% of the popular 
vote in 1974 and became a decisive factor for the minority Labour government at 
Westminster, while the PQ managed to take over the provincial government in 1976. These 
developments resulted in referenda on both the establishment of a Scottish Parliament in 
1979 and the concept of Québec's sovereignty-association in 1980 respectively. In both 
cases, the regionalists lost. Although a majority voted for devolution in Scotland, they failed 
to reach the required 40% of eligible voters. In Québec, 60% voted against sovereignty-
association. 
After years of disappointment and silence, the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, which was 
supposed to end the constitutional crisis by allowing Québec some specific rights and 
acknowledging the province as a "distinct society", and growing discontent with England-
based Conservative politics in Scotland led to a re-emergence of claims for more autonomy 
and even separatism. This is indicated by the growing success of both parties as well as 
polls on preferred constitutional options. In Québec the PQ, having campaigned for a new 
referendum on sovereignty, regained power in 1994, while in Scotland the social base 
supporting claims for devolution24 grew. For the first time, the Labour Party unanimously 
favoured devolution, backed by the unions, churches, local authorities and other parties and 
organizations. In addition, voting behaviour in Scotland diverged from the UK average in 
such a way that one can speak of a different party system. While the Labour Party became 
the strongest party in Scotland, the SNP emerged as the second party, while the 
Conservatives faced severe defeats, leaving them with 11 out of 72 seats in 1992 and none 
in 1997. The Québec government called for a new referendum in 1995, and again lost, 
although by slight margin. Scottish devolutionists had to wait for a new London government 
before they were able to hold their referendum. A broad coalition including the separatist 
SNP campaigned for the establishment of a Scottish Parliament and succeeded in gaining 
the support of three quarters of the voters. 
                                                 
23 Of course, in both cases protagonists of regionalism would consider themselves nationalists: they 
regard both Québec and Scotland as proper nations. Since the motivation for regionalist 
tendencies is based on an appeal to a nation, there is no doubt that one can speak of nationalism. 
Both terms will be used for these cases, however. For reasons of comparability with other cases 
and relating to global developments, we use the term regionalism in the theoretical approach. 
24 In the Scottish context, devolution means the establishment of a Scottish Parliament and its 
endowment with certain powers. The term has lost popularity since it implies "borrowing" 
competencies from the centre, but still is the commonly used term for what happened in the 
referendum of 1997: the establishment of a Parliament. 
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Fig. 1: Percentage of votes for the Parti Québécois in elections for the National 
Assembly. Source: Beisheim et al.25
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Fig. 2: Percentage of votes for the SNP in parliamentary elections in Scotland. 
Source: Lange 26
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Apart from electoral developments, polls also indicate growing support for constitutional 
change in both cases.27 In Scotland, the separatist option has gained support amongst the 
                                                 
25 Beisheim et al. (fn. 6), 358. 
26 Lange 1998a (fn. 19), 237. 
 
27 Maurice Pinard, "The dramatic reemergence of the Québec independence movement," Jounal of 
International Affairs 45, no. 1, (1992); Maurice Pinard, "Les quatre phases du mouvement 
indépendantiste québécois," in: Pinard, Robert Bernier and Vincent Lemieux, eds., Un combat 
inachevée (Sainte-Foy, Quebec: Presses de l'Universite du Quebec, 1997); Michael Keating, 
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roughly 80% favouring constitutional change.28 A change in the discourse can also be 
detected in Québec: While the 1980 referendum was about sovereignty-association, thereby 
stressing a future association with Canada, recent debates focus on political sovereignty as 
such. The future will show to what extent the establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 
1999 will lead to claims for more competencies and autonomy. In Québec, regionalism was 
also strengthened by the emergence of the Bloc Québécois, a separatist party running in the 
federal elections which has since gained two thirds of the province's seats. In sum, 
regionalism in both cases is stronger than ever and by no means a phenomenon of the past. 
 
5. Globalization in Regionalist Discourses 
 
In order to probe empirically whether the causal mechanisms identified in Section 1 also play 
a role in the seemingly deviant cases of Scotland and Québec, we now focus on the actual 
content of the regionalist discourse. Regionalist claims are never isolated topics within 
political discourse, but usually backed by functional arguments. This means that regional 
autonomy or souvereignty is seen as a means to reach other goals such as the preservation 
of culture, economic growth etc. To find out how much globalization has influenced 
regionalism, changes in the patterns of arguments made by the regionalists and their 
opponents will be examined. At the level of observation, the empirical question is to what 
extent arguments relating to developments induced by globalization have appeared and 
gained importance within the debate. Consequently, the analysis must focus on changes in 
the patterns of arguments made which paralleled the growth of regionalist tendencies in the 
respective region. A longitudinal comparison should thus include periods before and after 
accelerated denationalization and ask whether there has been a change in the regionalist 
discourses that indicates the importance of the causal pathways through which globalization 
may affect regionalism.29
                                                                                                                                                        
Nations against the State. The New Politics of Nationalism in Québec, Catalonia and Scotland 
(Houndsmills/London: MacMillan, New York: St. Martin's, 1996). 
28 The Economist, January 7, 1995. 
29 The sources used are literature, campaign documents and print media in specific periods. In 
addition to this, interviews were conducted with representatives of parties and other relevant 
collective actors such as unions and business associations. In Scotland, the first – pre-
denationalization – period analysed is the time from the first electoral success of the SNP until the 
referendum of 1979. The second – post-denationalization – period, from the early 1980s to the 
early 1990s, includes the time of the Scottish Constitutional Convention, a broad coalition of parties 
(Labour and Liberal democrats), the trade unions, churches and other groups, whose final report 
was presented in 1990. We added an analysis of the most recent developments, that is the 
referendum debate of 1997. The phases examined in Québec are quite similar, the first ranging 
from the rise of the PQ until the referendum of 1980, the second from the failure of the Meech Lake 
Accord to the presentation of the Bélanger-Campeau Commission's final report. The "Commission 
sur l'avenir politique et constitutionnel du Québec", named after their presidents Bélanger and 
Campeau, was set up after the constitutional amendment which was intended to guarantee 
Québec specific rights and recognition as a distinct society was rejected by two provinces. The 
commission held hearings all over the province and received petitions from over 600 organizations 
and individuals. Fifty-five experts were asked to assess Québec's future prospects. The final report 
was issued in March 1991, and concluded that, if re-negotiations of Québec's status within the 
federation should fail, the province should become sovereign (Commission sur l'avenir politique et 
constitutionnel du Québec (Bélanger-Campeau): Report, Québec [1991]). The third period is the 
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5.1 Regional Dispartiy and Welfare Regionalism 
If the notion holds true that regionalism is driven more and more by welfare chauvinism, then 
economic benefits of autonomy or separation should replace traditional regionalist claims for 
self-determination and social justice which dominated the discourse in the seventies. 
Whether this causal pathway can be identified also in the regionalist discourses in Scotland 
and Québec can be determined by looking at the following questions: Is the strength of 
regionalist tendencies based on growing economic self-confidence? Are regionalist claims 
increasingly based on arguments relating to economic advantages? To what extent is 
belonging to the current nation-state portrayed as an economic burden? Are the regionalists' 
economic objectives linked to social equality or restricted to economic growth in the region? 
When it comes to "welfare regionalism", neither Québec nor Scotland can be regarded as 
ideal cases, since both these regions have traditionally been considered as economically 
somewhat disadvantaged. However, both regions have caught up significantly within the last 
two decades. In the long run, Scotland has developed from a periphery into a part of the 
economic core.30 The Scottish economy, having suffered from the concentration of crisis 
ridden industries during much of this century, in the meantime recovered significantly.31 In 
1992, its per-capita GDP had reached 98.14% of the UK average. Bearing the concentration 
of economic activity in the South-West of the UK in mind, this leaves Scotland in a far better 
position than most other parts of the UK. Québec, on the other hand, has always been part of 
the economic core, although peripheral in comparison to Ontario.32 Its per-capita GDP 
remained below average and fell between 1965 and 1979 from 91.7 to 89.7%.33 In the long 
run, however, the reforms of the so-called Quiet Revolution34 and successive policies 
directed at strengthening the regional economy bore fruit. In 1987, Québec's economic 
growth was higher than Ontario's for the first time, it grew from 3.1% to 5.3% in 1988 and by 
that point had been positive for six years.35 On the whole, Québec and Scotland have moved 
up in the economic hierarchy of regions. Is this reflected in the regionalist discourses? 
(a) Scotland: Traditionally, the SNP had its biggest electoral support during economic crises, 
especially when both major parties could be held responsible. As a result, the rise of the 
debate prior to the most recent referendum in 1995. However, in the Québécois case, the debate 
on the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (FTA) allows some insight and was included where 
necessary. 
30 David McCrone, Understanding Scotland. The Sociology of a Stateless Nation (London: 
Routledge, 1992), 46. 
31 See David Bell and Sheila Dow, "Economic Policy Options for a Scottish Parliament," Scottish 
Affairs 13, (1995),  46. 
32 Kenneth McRoberts, "Internal Colonialism: the Case of Quebec," Ethnic and Racial Studies Vol. 2, 
No. 3 (1979), 298. 
33 William D. Shipman, ed., Trade and Investment Across the Northeast Boundary: Québec, the 
Atlantic Provinces and New England (Montréal: The Institute for Research on Public Policy [IRPP], 
1986), 15. 
34 The so-called Quiet Revolution was a government-led process of modernization in the 1960s 
aimed at economic growth and "province-building", that is, the extension of Québec's state 
apparatus (see William D. Coleman, The Independence Movement in Québec 1945-1980 [Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1984]; Alain G. Gagnon and Mary Beth Montcalm, Québec: Beyond 
the Quiet Revolution [Toronto: Nelson, 1989]). 
35 See Matthew Fraser, Québec Inc. French-Canadian Entrepreneurs and the New Business Elite 
(Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1987), 97ff.; and Canada/Department of Industry, Science and 
Technology, The Québec Economy 1988. Planning, Analysis and Evaluation (Ottawa, 1989), 2. 
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party in the late sixties correlated with the decline of heavy industries.36 On the other hand, 
the feeling of being financially dependent on the UK proved to be a major obstacle to the 
growth of nationalism. This constellation changed during the 1970s, when new growth 
centres emerged in Scotland and North Sea Oil was discovered. Now the SNP could point to 
the problem areas saying "look how it is" and to the oil centres saying "look how it could 
be".37 These examples indicate that the argument, Scotland was actually rich, but betrayed of 
her wealth, had already become a central part of SNP propaganda. The actual oil-campaign 
began in 1971, arguing that, according to international law, the oil belonged to the Scottish 
people. Being part of the UK, Scotland had to remit 90% of the revenue, and Scottish oil was 
used to readjust the English economy, i.e. London's traffic system.38 Central slogans were 
"We Scots are the most generous people on earth – we are giving our oil away", and 
"Scotland's oil – to London with love?"39 At the same time, the SNP tried to improve their 
leftist image by declaring a "war on Scottish poverty".40
The unionists, however, used the same strategy as in the sphere of trade and markets (see 
below, 4.3), and warned Scots that they were running the risk of losing British subsidies. 
Their campaign centred around three issues: (1) the costs of a Scottish Assembly, (2) too 
much government, and (3) the end of the UK.41 The latter is usually referred to as the 
"slippery slope" argument: Devolution being the first step towards independence. These 
issues provided a negative agenda, which meant that the devolutionists always had to argue 
against negative consequences instead of proclaiming the advantages.42
After the 1979 referendum was lost, the SNP focused on the "big lie"43 that Scotland was 
dependent on UK finances. North Sea Oil was still on the agenda, but to a lesser extent than 
in the seventies. The SNP used the oil argument against the Constitutional Convention's 
devolution plans, claiming that such a concept would leave the oil with London.44 However, 
the argument surrounding Scotland's potential wealth was moved away from the oil question 
and tended to be based on factors such as Edinburgh being a financial centre, and the 
emerging High Tech industries. The devolutionists concentrated on London's policies, which 
were said to harm the Scottish economy. 
The unionists did not change their strategy of depicting Scotland as being financially 
dependent on the UK and tried to convince the public that the recent growth was a result of 
                                                 
36  See Byron Criddle, "Scotland, The EEC and Devolution," in Martin Kolinski, ed., Divided Loyalities. 
British RegionalAssortion and European Integration (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1978), 49. 
37  Ibid. 
38  Billy Wolfe, Scotland Lives (Edinburgh: Reprographia, 1973), 157ff. 
39  Ibid. 
40  See Ian O. Bayne, 1991: "The Impact of 1979 on the SNP," in Tom Gallagher, ed., Nationalism in 
the Nineties (Edinburgh: Polygon, 1991), 52. 
41 Robert McLean, Labour and Scottish Home Rule, Part 2/Unionist Complacency to Crisis 
Management 1945-1988 (Broxburn: Labour Communications, 1989), 36. 
42 Ray Perman, "The Devolution Referendum Campaign of 1979," in H. M. and N.L. Drucker, eds., 
Scottish Government Yearbook 1980, 59. 
43 Jim Sillars/SNP 1991: Scotland and Europe 1992. Time for Decision, Edinburgh (1991), 3. 
44 Alexander Salmond, "Northern Ireland and the Scottish Question", in Scottish Affairs 13 (1995), 74; 
and SNP (Scottish National Party), Best for Scotland - A Real Scottish Parliament (Internet, 1996), 
4. 
   15
 
                                                
governmental policies.45 Even after the 1997 election, they centred their campaign against 
devolution particularly on the argument that public expenditure in Scotland was higher than 
the UK average. Although this was a relevant issue for the voters,46 their strategy did not 
bear fruit. Scotland Forward and member organizations, although still reacting to such 
claims, successfully appealed to the growing economic self-consciousness amongst Scots, 
which, according to observers (several interviews), was one of the main reasons for the 
referendum result.  
In sum, it is certainly stretching the facts to speak of welfare regionalism in the Scottish case. 
The analysis nevertheless shows how important a reasonably strong economy, in this case 
based on export-oriented sectors - and especially a conscious awareness of this fact - is for 
regionalist mobilization. Scotland moved from relative deprivation towards relative economic 
stability and devolution. Since economic success used to be a central legitimizing factor for 
the UK in Scotland,47 the unionists now faced severe difficulties in convincing the Scottish 
electorate of the economic advantages of the union. 
b) Québec: Québec's relative peripherality to Ontario was a major obstacle for the 
separatists. They had difficulties in convincing the public that sovereignty would be 
economically viable. When support for the PQ grew in the late sixties and early seventies, 
the federalists focused their arguments on economic issues. They published calculations 
suggesting that the province received half a billion dollars more than it paid to the federal 
government annually and promised "profitable federalism" as the only viable alternative.48 
Since the subjective economic expectations amongst the public were rather pessimistic, the 
PQ was in an unfavourable position to argue against fears that sovereignty would mean a net 
financial loss.49 The PQ's situation worsened after the 1976 elections when federal politicians 
declared that, in negotiations on future financial transfers, they would bear in mind that the 
province had a separatist government.50 The economic crisis at that time added pressure on 
the PQ government and the supporters of sovereignty-association. As a result, they declared 
that the referendum would be held on the mandate to negotiate sovereignty-association, 
while any future changes of the status quo should be subject to a second referendum.51 In 
addition, the PQ and the trade unions argued that the economic difficulties were a result of 
 
45 HMSO (Her Majesty's Scottish Office), Scotland and the Union. A Partnership for Good 
(Edinburgh, 1993), 13f. 
46 Political Context, Report on Devolution Poll (London, 1996), 5. 
47 Lindsay Paterson, "Editorial. The Failure of Scottland's Political Parties," Scottish Affairs 3 (1993). 
48  John Saywell, The Rise of the Parti Québécois 1967-76 (Toronto/Buffalo: University of Toronto 
Press, 1977), 31ff. 
49 See Clift, Dominique, Quebec. Nationalism in Crisis (Kingston/Montreal: McGill-Queen's University 
Press, 1982), 89. 
50 The Toronto Star, Nov. 20, 1976. 
51 Marsolais, Claude-V., Le référendum confisqué. Histoire du référendum québécois du 20 mai 
1980, Montréal: vlb éditeur, 1992, 75-250, here: 150f. 
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Québec being disadvantaged within the federation.52 This strategy to dissipate widespread 
economic fears failed however – as indicated by several polls.53
When the Meech Lake Accord was rejected in 1990, Québec's economy was in a far better 
position; even some members of the traditionally federalist Liberals argued that a separation 
could be economically advantageous.54 PQ leader Jacques Parizeau centred his arguments 
for separation on the negative effects that Canadian federalism had on the Québec 
economy.55 In its report to the Bélanger-Campeau Commission, the PQ even argued that 
inter-provincial transfer payments would cost Québec more than it received.56 Based on the 
experts' views, the Commission concluded that Québec's economy was healthy and well-
equipped to play in the "jeu économique mondial".57 Even the federalist Liberals stated that 
the economy was strong enough for Québec to survive as a sovereign state.58 Although they 
did not share the conclusion that sovereignty was inevitable, they agreed that Québec could 
consider all alternatives to the constitutional status quo.59
During the referendum campaign of 1995, the PQ still argued that Québec would be better 
off without Canada. The federal government would spend less money on economic 
development in Québec than elsewhere60 and the province would save three billion 
Canadian Dollars in expenditures if it became independent.61 The umbrella organization for 
the Yes side, the "partenaires pour la souveraineté", argued that an independent Québec 
would be one of the "small wealthy countries" in the world.62 The unions supported the PQ 
and accused the federalists of "scaremongering".63 In sum, the question of competencies in 
the field of economic policies played an important role in the campaign, while both sides 
quoted experts on whether sovereignty would harm or benefit the economy. 
The decisive argument, however, was still on the side of the federalists: the national debt. 
Since Québec would have to take over its part of the debt, they argued, the province would 
run into a financial crisis.64 A smaller state would not be as "credible" to the banks, and the 
                                                 
52 Québec/Gouvernement/Conseil exécutif, Québec-Canada: A New Deal. The Québec 
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54 The Gazette, March 9, 1990. 
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56 PQ (Parti Québécois), La necessaire souveraineté (Québec, 1990), Annexe. 
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61 PQ (Parti Québécois), Sovereignty. Answers to your Questions (Montréal, 1995), 26. 
62 Partenaires por la souveraineté, Une société de projets (Montréal, 1995) (div. leaflets). 
63 FTQ (Fédération des travailleurs et travailleuses du Québec), Déclaration sur l'avenir du Québec 
(Montréal, 1990), 5. 
64 Raynauld, André, "Les finances publiques du Québec et le défi de la séparation," in Comité des 
Québécoises et des Québécois pour le NON (eds.), Des voix pour le NON (Québec, 1995), 81/84. 
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financial situation would result in a lower standard of living.65 Their arguments were 
supported by the ongoing economic crisis in the mid-1990s. Since support for the status quo 
always grows during crises,66 the federalists did not have to pronounce the benefits of 
federalism. Instead, they focussed their campaign on the risks of sovereignty. This strategy 
obviously brought forth the intended results: 75% of all those opposing sovereignty did so 
because they feared negative economic consequences.67 Even though the separatists 
gained 10% compared to the referendum of 1980, they failed to convince the public that 
sovereignty was an economically viable option. Against this empirical background it is 
certainly wrong to speak of welfare regionalism. However, the relative catching-up of Québec 
economy changed the regionalists' strategies and broadened their support base. 
 
5.2 The Functionality of Regions 
The argument that the regional level is more "functional" for economic steering is usually 
based on structural changes in the world economy. The notion of regional growth clusters is 
an epistemic concept based upon a certain understanding of what is logical and feasible in a 
denationalized economy. The question is then to what degree such considerations have 
entered into the debate both within and about the region, and to what degree are they used 
to support regionalist claims. Empirically, we need to ask: To what extent is the popular 
"small is beautiful" argument regarding economic steering used to support regionalist claims? 
Do regionalists relate to the nation-state's loss of economic steering capacity and to regional 
strategies to attract foreign investment? 
(a) Scotland: Adequate economic policy strategies specifically relating to Scotland already 
played a significant role when the SNP had their first electoral success. At that time, 
however, the debate centred around domestic control of the economy. For the SNP, it was 
clear that all relevant decisions had to be made at the Scottish level if the economic situation 
were to be improved.68 The Labour Party was split between its commitment to 
decentralization and the centralist agenda of seventies-style socialism.69
The counter-argument was pushed by organized business. Accusing the devolutionists of 
"emotional nationalism", the Scottish section of the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) 
denied any economic rationale for devolution and warned that devolution would lead to 
confusion, insecurity and thus the withdrawal of investors.70 This lay the foundation for the 
No-side's main line of argument in the referendum debate. Together with the costs of an 
Assembly, "insecurity" was their main argument. They went so far as to claim that, if 
business was against devolution, it must be bad for the economy.71 The Yes-side was on the 
 
65 CPQ (Conseil du Patronat du Québec), Bulletin Special Issue 3: The Dollar and the Debt: The 
Risks of Independence (Montréal, 1995), 4. 
66 Michael Keating: "Canada and Quebec: Two Nationalisms in the Global Age," Scottish Affairs  11, 
(1995), 23. 
67 The Gazette, 3.10.1995. 
68 See Ray Burnett, "Socialists and the SNP," in Gordon Brown (ed.), The Red Paper on Scotland 
(Edinburgh: EUSPB, 1975), 110. 
69 McLean (fn. 41), 18-21. 
70 See C. J. Risk, "Devolution. The Commercial Community's Fears," in: Scottish Government 
Yearbook 1978, 120-128 and The Herald, Feb. 20, 1978. 
71 The Herald, Feb. 28, 1979. 
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defensive. They could barely do more than accuse the unionists of "scaremongering", but the 
agenda was set by the No-side. 
During the eighties, the Labour Party slowly replaced their traditional centralism by a "small is 
beautiful" argument. Partly in reaction to the Tories' neo-liberal policies, devolution was 
increasingly linked with economic policy reforms, which suggested that a Scottish Parliament 
should be given more competencies than the Assembly proposed in the seventies. The 1992 
election manifesto declared that devolution was part of a renewed industrial policy .72 The 
unions followed this line of argument. The "functionality" of economic planning at the Scottish 
level became a central element of their manifestos.73 Both Labour and the STUC were 
central actors within the Constitutional Convention, whose economic policy concepts were 
rather interventionist.74 The establishment of a Scottish Parliament was increasingly seen as 
a source of wealth, while the "functionality" of such an institution was deemed to be based on 
(a) the rather corporatist tradition in Scotland, (b) the proximity to the problems, and (c) the 
possibility to overcome London's detrimental economic policies.75
The SNP's program underwent a similar development. Political competencies to shape poli-
cies according to the needs of the economy became a central element of their demands. 
Taking the European context explicitly into account, the party saw economic planning at the 
Scottish level as the key to economic growth, while "control" was replaced by "attracting 
investment". When Salmond became party leader, the "Scottish Centre for Economic and 
Social Research" was founded to supply the party's arguments with expertise. Later, the 
SNP also employed external experts to convince the public of their economic aptitude. This 
proved to be the strategy with which to counter the Conservatives' argument concerning 
business. The SNP and the devolutionists were eager to quote businesspeople who favoured 
devolution or even independence. 
Organized business, on the other hand, had become rather cautious. Although they were still 
against devolution, they argued along functional lines and mainly against "too much interven-
tionism" and other leftist points. Only ideologically neo-liberal organizations such as "Aims of 
Industry" publicly fought against devolution. The Conservatives, however, did not change 
their strategies at all. Even when the 1997 referendum drew near, there was barely any 
change of arguments in the unionist camp. They focused on the costs of a Parliament and 
too much bureaucracy, both of which would inevitably lead to more taxes. Labelling them 
"Tartan Tax", they implied that Scots would have to pay taxes for folkloristic nationalism. 
Finally, they repeated their old argument that public expenditure was higher in Scotland, 
which would mean that a Scottish Parliament would inevitably have to rise taxes. As the 
referendum result reveals, such arguments did not fall on fertile ground. Being deprived of 
their most important ally, organized business, the Conservatives failed to convince the public 
of the dangers of devolution. Aside from a small group of conservative businessmen, most 
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organizations remained silent during the campaign, although CBI was convinced that most 
businesspeople would still be against devolution .76
Taxes proved to be the only point for the No-side to be made during the referendum cam-
paign. Although the devolutionists were never able to overcome the widespread mental con-
nection of tax powers and tax-raising powers, it was not sufficient to deter the people from 
devolution. When it came to the "trust" of the business community and "functionality", the 
devolutionists moved from the defensive and reactive to the offensive and pro-active 
position. They even managed to make the economic benefits a central campaign issue 
(press analysis) and to sell devolution as a means to improve the economy. With the aid of 
polls, they were able to grasp the people's fears and hopes and to shape their arguments 
accordingly. Although social issues were more dominant in the debate, it was with the 
economic policy agenda that the devolutionists gained the most ground. 
(b) Québec: The PQ has always been concerned with economic policy conceptions. As 
opposed to the Canadian mainstream, it was founded as a social democratic party favouring 
interventionist policies. Therefore, organized business (mainly Anglophone) opposed the 
party from the outset and threatened to pull out of the province if the PQ were elected. 
Although the PQ platform was already more business-friendly than in 1970, it still demanded 
tripartite corporatist strategies, foreign investment controls and public ownership in some 
areas – and won. The Liberals, trying to use the threats uttered by business for their 
federalist purposes, did not succeed in portraying a PQ government as an economic risk. 
Business associations continued to fight separatism and financed the "Federalist Committee" 
which led the No-side in the 1980 referendum campaign. Backed by the trade unions, the PQ 
campaigned for sovereignty-association and linked this model to their interventionist 
strategies. While the Lévesque-government accused Canada's "inherent centralism" of 
causing economic problems for Québec, it demanded more economic powers for the 
province, including taxation and tariff legislation.77 The unsuccessful referendum, however, 
shows that the PQ had been elected for their economic and social policy and not because 
the public wanted sovereignty. 
In the early eighties, the PQ moved toward the neoliberal mainstream and favoured 
deregulation.78 Their relations with business improved, but the latter were still opposed to the 
PQ's main goal. After the failure of Meech Lake, the Conseil du Patronat (CPQ) did at least 
support the decentralization of important competencies. Within the parameters of the 
Bélanger-Campeau Commission, business representatives agreed that Québec, not Canada, 
should have the resources and powers to support the provincial economy's adaptation to the 
world market. They were not in favour of sovereignty, albeit less opposed than before. 
Parizeau attempted to use this change of mind as an argument for the economic soundness 
of separatism.79
The Bélanger-Campeau Commission focused on functional arguments. Canadian federalism 
was considered inefficient while struggles over competencies used up too many resources, 
polarize and scare investors. According to the Commission, the current system was unable 
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to face the challenges of globalization .80 Their experts argued in a similar manner, citing 
small states like Norway as examples of successful adaptation to the world economy.81 
Parizeau argued that Québec needed sovereignty to reach goals such as full employment 
and environmental protection.82 The Liberals did not quite share this view, but agreed that 
Canada did not pay enough for research and development (R&D) in Québec and that the 
constitutional situation was the main source of all economic problems.83 Québec's 
advantages were seen in the corporatist structures and established policy instruments within 
the province – a legacy from its interventionist past.84
The PQ profited well from such a unanimity amongst political forces concerning the 
necessary decentralization of political powers in the economic sphere and won the 1994 
elections. The PQ's program "Québec dans un monde nouveau"85 concentrated on functional 
arguments about the potential of economic steering in Québec and explicitly referred to 
globalization. Canadian federalism was considered incapable of accomplishing the new 
projét de societé the PQ was striving for. Elements of the "industrial districts" model were as 
obvious in the program as traces of Katzenstein's Small States in World Markets being 
Parizeau's favourite book (interview). During the referendum campaign, experts and reports 
stressing the competitiveness of small states were quoted. PQ officials compared a 
sovereign Québec to financial centres like Luxembourg or Singapore.86
Just as it had been 15 years earlier, the 1995 referendum debate was dominated by 
economic issues. When it came to considerations of functionality, the Yes-camp was now on 
the offensive. While the trade unions backed the PQ's functional arguments,87 business 
moved again to the opposite camp. Although some industrialists joined a group which 
declared that business should stay out of the debate, the big organizations publicly opposed 
sovereignty. Their main arguments, however, were concerned with resources and markets, 
the only "functional" point being the threat of "insecurity" damaging the economic climate.88 
Liberal leader Johnson referred to liberalized financial markets, indicating that investors' first 
reaction to a Yes in the referendum would be to withdraw large sums from Québec.89
To sum up: The widespread agreement that economic steering in smaller territorial units has 
functional advantages helped the sovereigntists to set the agenda. Functionality arguments 
did, however, not convince the public of the necessity of sovereignty. Nor were they able to 
convince business, whose fears of constitutional change were stronger than any expectation 
to profit from decentralization. Nevertheless, it became a significant component of the 
regionalist discourse. 
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5.3 Diminishing Economic Risks and Market-Making International Institutions 
The transnational integration of markets diminishes or even eliminates the risks traditionally 
associated with the realization of regionalist objectives, ie. the loss of national markets and 
investors. If economic globalization strengthens regionalism, it should be expected that 
regionalist actors will increasingly refer to this process. The following questions, therefore, 
need to be adressed. (1) To what extent has the argument that political decentralization 
leads to the loss of markets played a role in the past? Is it still employed or has it 
disappeared from the debate? (2) Are economic interdependence and integration 
increasingly used to defend regionalist objectives against such accusations? To what extent 
do regionalist actors refer to the transnational market? 
Both the UK and Canada are subject to economic integration. While Canada is a member of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the UK is a member of the EU and 
thereby part of the Common Market. Foreign trade has grown significantly over the last 
decades, in Britain from US $ 20.65 billion (1970) to $ 112.99 billion (1980) and $ 250.02 
billion in 1990.90 The Scottish economy is even more open, accounting for more then 10% of 
British exports.91 Canada has the highest export quota (foreign trade compared to GDP) 
amongst the G7 states, followed by the UK, while foreign trade has changed directions. After 
a long period of protectionism against US imports, during which the largest share of foreign 
trade was with the UK, successive trade liberalization measures have made the USA the 
most important external market for Canadian products. 
For both regions, however, the "national" market remains important. In 1986, Québec 
exported around 40% of its GDP, and half of it went to other Canadian provinces.92 This ratio 
has changed, however. While the ratio of interprovincial versus international trade was 116% 
in 1981, it declined to 72% in 1994.93 In the Scottish case, it should be kept in mind that 
market access was the main motive of Scottish elites to negotiate the Act of Union.94 Scot-
land's most important market remains the rest of the UK, although the importance of the EU 
has grown significantly. When the UK entered the EC in 1973, only 23% of all Scottish 
exports went to other member states. In 1992, this share had more than doubled with 59% 
going to the European Common Market.95 Is this change in the relative importance of the 
national markets and the increasing stability of transnational markets reflected in the 
regionalist discourse? 
(a) Scotland: The question whether Scottish autonomy or separation would reduce market 
accessibility for Scottish industry has always dominated the debate on nationalism in 
Scotland. Hence, the SNP was reproached for risking Scotland's economic well-being from 
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their first electoral campaigns onwards. Although the party tried to repudiate this blame by 
explicitly declaring the maintenance of economic union with England a principal goal,96 they 
remained quite defensive in this respect. The problem was aggravated by the party's stance 
on European integration at the time: their slogan "no to London and Brussels", which was 
coined in defence of the steel and fishing industries,97 did not seem to favour economic 
integration. The unionists, on the other hand, succeeded in convincing the public that a big 
market was more important than autonomy and the implementation of Scottish economic 
policies.98 The anti-devolutionists' main line of argument was, nonetheless, the "slippery 
slope" argument: devolution would lead to secession, which then would mean the break-up 
of markets.99 Although the Labour government tried to convince the public that devolution 
would actually preserve the union, the devolutionists maintained their defensive stance. 
The situation changed in the late 1980s, when the SNP developed their "Independence in 
Europe" concept, which allowed them to propagate the advantages of an even larger market. 
A central, and usually the principle, argument was that Scotland would remain a member of 
the EC.100 "For example, the single market between Scotland and England is guaranteed by 
the 1957 Treaty of Rome and the 1987 Single European Act – not the 1707 Treaty of 
Union".101 The party moved beyond such defensive lines of argument and began to embrace 
the idea of an open economy as such. The SNP viewed the Common Market as an 
opportunity for the Scottish export-oriented economy which could only be exploited properly 
by an independent Scottish government.102 Pointing to other successful sub-state units and 
small states in Europe, the SNP portrayed devolution as the "natural" answer to the 
challenges and prospects of European integration and globalization.103 The unionists (mainly 
the Tories and organized business), on the other hand, did not change their strategies at all 
and tried to fight devolution and separatism with the same arguments, i.e. using the "slippery 
slope" thesis.104 Still, the devolutionists were no longer pressurized by such arguments. In 
sum, the roles within the debate on this issue had changed completely, with the 
devolutionists moving from the defensive to a pro-active, offensive position. 
(b) Québec: In a similar way to the SNP, the PQ has always been charged with jeopardizing 
access to the national market, although such fears have been accounted for in all their 
programs, and, in particular, in their concept of "sovereignty-association". In spite of these 
attempts to assure the public that sovereignty would not mean fragmented markets, their 
political opponents at the national and provincial levels as well as organized business did not 
stop to urge this issue. While the federal government announced that it would reject any 
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negotiations with a sovereign Québec, business leaders declared that they would pull out of 
the province if it became sovereign.105
When the Free Trade Agreement with the United States was negotiated in the mid-eighties, 
hardly any one saw a connection between free trade and Québec's sovereignty. A 
remarkable exception was the subsequent PQ-leader Jacques Parizeau, an economist, who 
declared that sovereignty could no longer endanger markets for Québécois business. He 
even considered "sovereignty-association" obsolete, since markets would now be 
guaranteed by the FTA and he expected business to line up with the nationalists.106 Although 
the claim for free trade with the USA had a certain tradition within the nationalist camp, this 
discussion was restricted to a very small group of intellectuals and did not play a role in the 
public debate. 
After Parizeau was elected as the party leader, free trade became a central issue for the PQ. 
Parizeau assumed that free trade had also changed Canada's ideological landscape, making 
it impossible to cut economic ties with any partner.107 The federalists, on the other hand, 
argued that a sovereign Québec would not automatically become a member of the FTA and 
that economic ties would have to be re-negotiated.108 By contrast, the Bélanger-Campeau 
Commission agreed that the maintenance of the Canadian market was essential, but did not 
consider it to be endangered by sovereignty. On the contrary, trade liberalization was even 
seen as a reason to devolve all the political competencies in the economic sphere to 
Québec.109
As the date of the referendum approached, the federalists managed to make market access 
the central issue of the debate. In doing so, they once again, pressurized the PQ government 
into assuming a defensive stance. The federal government assisted by declaring that 
Canada, not Québec, would dictate the conditions of future economic links. Even the US 
government supported this view with respect to NAFTA. During the campaign, both sides 
employed experts to support their views, but the federalist camp was clearly in the lead. 
To sum up, although the PQ had developed from a traditionally social democratic to a liberal 
party at least in terms of foreign trade, and had explicitly developed a concept of "free trade 
nationalism",110 the opposite camp had grasped the importance of this issue. The polls 
suggested that guaranteed economic union was a major precondition for voting Yes in the 
referendum,111 and the federalists were clever enough to shatter the PQ's argument that this 
would be the case in the public mind. However, the changed circumstances were reflected in 
the contents of the debate, and in the fact that the result of the referendum was much closer 
than before. 
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5.4 Sovereignty and Multi-Level Governance 
When a nation-state's problem-solving capacity becomes less effective in many areas, 
regionalist movements can make use of this weakness by adapting their arguments. They 
can question traditional notions of sovereignty by, for example, relating regional autonomy to 
supranational integration and international co-operation. They can also, as the example of 
the Lega Nord makes clear, exploit individuals' fears and insecurities arising out of the 
decline of effecitive national and public security policies by propagating "law-and-order" and 
promising the re-establishment of the state's problem solving capacity. The central 
intervening variable is a strong involvement of the respective state in international and 
supranational institutions that also aim at market-correcting policies. If they do have an 
influence, then the regionalist discourse can be expected to indicate a new understanding of 
the state and the political sphere. The question then arises which form and what level of 
autonomy regionalists demand? Have their concepts changed from a more fragmentative 
(i.e. absolute sovereignty) to a more integrative (pro supranational integration) regionalism? 
If this is the case, do they base their argument on the nation-state's ineffective problem-
solving capacities while aiming at re-establishing it through supranational integration and 
regional governance? To what degree do democratic arguments such as self-determination 
and better access to supranational decision-making processes play a role in the regionalist 
discourse? 
To begin with, both Canada and Britain are strongly involved in international co-operation, 
the latter even being a member of the EU, which balances negative integration (market-
making policies) with positive integration (market-correcting policies). In contrast, NAFTA, of 
which Canada is a member, lacks positive integration and thus does not provide resources 
for regions on a supranational level. 
(a) Scotland: One of the decisive splits between the SNP and Labour concerned the notion of 
statehood. Like the SNP, the latter were quite state-centered in their strategies, but the state 
they had in mind was the British state. This social democratic centralism changed only after 
the 1974 elections, though mainly for tactical reasons, that is, they saw a Labour-dominated 
Scottish Parliament as a tool to reach their own political goals.112 This indicates to their 
purely instrumentalist approach to devolution. Originally, the SNP fought on the same 
platform: sovereignty was the principal goal, allowing Scotland to redistribute wealth and 
steer the economy.113 The 1977 program still declared "sovereignty over territory and 
resources" to be the principal aim.114
The unionists only started to pick up such issues when the 1979 referendum drew closer. 
Their political arguments focussed on the "West Lothian Question", that is, the reduction of 
Scottish MPs at Westminster, and the "slippery slope" argument, which implied that 
devolution would be the first step to independence.115 The argument exacerbated the 
growing dissatisfaction with reforms and institutional changes in the last years of the Labour 
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government. One of their central points, therefore, was "too much bureaucracy", thereby 
forcing the devolutionists to argue against negative consequences instead of promoting 
positive ones. The only positive alteration the devolutionists could forward was the 
democratic question, but they failed to establish this as an issue in the debate. Finally, the 
"slippery slope" and other negative issues dominated the agenda, aggravated by the 
negative record of the then unpopular Labour government.116
The election of the Thatcher government changed things completely. All political and social 
forces which had been opposed to the neo-liberal retreat of the state now saw devolution as 
a means to re-establish the state's problem-solving capacity. The Scottish trade unions, 
being active members of the Constitutional Convention, made devolution a core element of 
their platforms. Devolution was seen as the only strategy to get "better policies" in many 
fields: "... a Scottish Parliament could take action to intervene – to create jobs and cut 
unemployment. The same arguments hold when you are talking about other "bread and 
butter" issues too – health, education, social services".117 The growing perception of the 
necessity of devolution was clearly a reaction to Conservative politics. Labour and the 
Constitutional Convention argued along two strands: first, they stressed the democratic 
argument, accusing the government of establishing many undemocratic QUANGOS (quasi 
non-governmental organizations). Second, they sought the re-establishment of instruments 
for economic and social planning.118 Although Labour subsequently watered down the 
Convention's proposals in their own manifestos, the party clearly incorporated devolution into 
a wider concept of political reform. 
Labour also changed their thinking on the issue of sovereignty. While the party had stressed 
Scots Law and the sovereignty of the people until the early 1990s, Blair now declared that 
the sovereignty of Westminster would not be touched by devolution.119 The SNP’s 
understanding of sovereignty had already changed within their concept of "Independence in 
Europe". Membership of the EC was considered a legitimate reason for reducing sovereignty 
in some areas.120 Sovereignty was still considered necessary to be an "equal amongst 
equals" in Europe, but the "pooling of sovereignty" was welcomed.121 Similar to the 
Convention, the SNP linked their constitutional goals to democratic reforms. 
As in other areas, the Tories' arguments did not waver at all. They reiterated the "slippery 
slope" argument and the danger of losing Scottish influence in Westminster, which had 
secured Scotland's advantages under the union.122 Democratic reforms such as proportional 
representation were regarded with suspicion. Scottish MPs elected on lists would not have 
direct links with their voters. Consequently, allowing them to decide would be an "insult" to 
Scotland.123
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During the referendum debate, linking devolution and democratic reform proved helpful to the 
Yes-side. Their campaign was dominated by four topics: (1) the polarization between 
Scotland and the Tories, (2) the portrayal of devolution as a means to modernization, (3) 
arguments against the threat of higher taxes and, finally, (4) the implication that under 
devolution Scots would decide Scottish affairs.124 The latter point became increasingly 
central. The Tories' lack of political legitimation and their unpopular policies were increasingly 
used to mobilize the public. In this issue area, the Yes-side managed to concentrate on the 
positive aspects of devolution, while the negative agenda was limited to Tory policies. 
Scotland Forward and affiliate organizations promised progressive, interventionist and 
socially equitable policies. Social policy remained a strong issue, and devolution was sold as 
an "insurance" against Conservative onslaughts on the welfare state. 
The development of the SNP's understanding of sovereignty cannot be analysed without 
taking the European context into account. Of course, their No-campaign before the referen-
dum on EC-membership was based on fears of centralization ("No to London and Brussels"), 
and the main reason was that Scotland would not be represented ("No voice, no entry"). As a 
proper nation, Scotland could not be represented in Brussels by England.125 But even before 
"Independence in Europe" was adopted as an official strategy, their programs became more 
pro European, although "Scotland's voice" remained the central argument for symbolic and 
pragmatic reasons. Amongst the former was the expectation that a positive image fostered 
by a Scottish EU Commissioner or EU presidency would strengthen Scottish self-
consciousness. A pragmatic reason is the simple fact that many relevant decisions are now 
taken at the European level. Finally, a pro-European stance was a convenient opportunity to 
charge the Tories for depriving Scotland of some benefits through their anti-European image. 
However, the most important change can be detected in the party's understanding of 
sovereignty. The necessity of veto powers in the EU was no longer derived from historical 
claims to sovereignty. Instead, it was increasingly seen in pragmatic terms, and it was 
thought that veto powers would never be invoked anyhow. A positive, pro-European image 
would be the best for Scotland. The "little Englanders" had always fought against Europe and 
had developed a negative image. European integration was seen as an example for small 
states which had never been as powerful as within the EU framework, where the 
Commission would support their interests.126 Finally, the change towards "Independence in 
Europe" was a strategic move to fight the Tories' argument that the SNP would turn Scotland 
into a "socialist, isolated state".127 They were even able to turn the argument around and 
blame the Tories for isolating Scotland from the rest. 
The non-separatist devolutionists increasingly referred to the European context to support 
their arguments as well. Following the STUC, the Labour Party portrayed Europe as a means 
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to fight Conservative policies by gaining allies across the continent.128 Decentralization was 
seen as compatible with developments on the continent, where, according to the Labour 
Party, subnational units like the German Länder had the opportunity to influence European 
policies. To their understanding, having a Scottish voice and belonging to a big member state 
were two ways of exerting as much influence as possible. The fact that they referred to the 
Committee of the Regions did, of course, invoke harsh criticism from the SNP, who had no 
desire to define Scotland as merely a region. The concepts of the Constitutional Convention 
and other organizations include the European context as well. The Convention was the 
organization that moved the furthest away from traditional understandings of sovereignty. 
According to them, Scotland should have a voice in Europe, but not by establishing a new 
nation-state. In any event, Europe was moving away from that concept, while the principle of 
subsidiarity would increase the importance of sub-national units.129  
Taken together, domestic political factors and the European context advantaged those forces 
in Scotland which fought for political decentralization. The devolutionists' goal to re-establish 
the state's problem-solving capacity was obviously in line with the desires of the Scottish 
electorate. Scotland Forward was clever enough to study their opinions and needs and use 
the results of such polls to adjust their campaign.130 Most importantly, the SNP’s perception 
of sovereignty also had changed. According to Isabel Lindsay,131 three aspects of the SNP's 
pro-European move have to be distinguished. They now saw Europe as a means to (a) 
achieve independence by bypassing Westminster, (b) refute the blame of being separatist, 
and (c) to find a way out of psychological and practical dependence on the UK. 
(b) Québec: The debate on economic policy as already seen above has indicated that the 
PQ has always been a political force that stressed the importance of state intervention. This 
strong role was not restricted to domestic policies, for their understanding of sovereignty 
resembled de Gaulle's "Europe des patries".132 This mixture of a strong state and absolute 
sovereignty led the federalist Liberals to criticize the Péquistes for their "isolationism" and 
refer to their leader, René Lévesque, as the "Castro of Québec".133 The PQ's strong 
interventionism made the unions their truest ally, since they expected sovereignty to lead to 
"democratic socialism".134 When the PQ was first elected to provincial government in 1976, 
the "patriation" of the Canadian constitution was on the agenda, while both main political 
parties used the debate to demand more powers for Québec within the federation. The 
difference, however, lay in the PQ's insistence on sovereignty, which was still traditional but 
did not exclude economic interdependence. Referring to international law, the PQ 
government defined sovereignty as the ability to make political decisions without being 
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subordinate to any superior political level.135 While the social democratic program had 
already been watered down, the PQ government still promised state-centred social develop-
ment. An independent Québec should be able to combine social, employment and education 
policies in order to follow a coherent strategy of social development, which again persuaded 
the then PQ-critical trade unions to support them in the referendum campaign. 
In this area, the Liberals had more difficulties in countering the PQ's arguments. They were 
eager not to appear as defenders of the status quo, but promised "renewed federalism" with 
more powers for Québec.136 They still believed in the possibility of asymmetrical federalism, 
claiming that both levels of government should be "sovereign" in their competencies.137 
Attacked by Lévesque, who said that their position would then even fall behind the attempts 
of the last 20 years to achieve more power, the Liberals turned to the Québec version of the 
"slippery slope" argument. A Québec run by separatists and demanding "sovereignty-
association" with Canada would be similar to Cuba trying to become a Canadian province.138
Political rights and sovereignty re-entered the political agenda only two years after the 
referendum, when the constitution was "repatriated" from London without Québec's consent. 
The refusal of special competencies to the province was seen as the denial of the 
Francophones' political community.139 The claim to more political power was also based on 
the federal government's refusal to include Québec's status as a "distinct society" in the 
constitution. Political and cultural aspects are, therefore, difficult to separate here. The 
"distinct society" clause was included in the later rejected Meech Lake Accord. After its 
failure, the Bélanger-Campeau Commission also argued that Québec needed more political 
powers to defend the Francophone community. On the one hand, then, the Commission 
admitted that, in the face of globalization, the state had lost some influence. On the other 
hand, it was expected that having the powers of a sovereign state would enable Québec to 
organize social change.140
In the years that followed, a gap between the PQ's platform and actual policies can be 
detected. While the party's economic policy had become rather neo-liberal and traditional 
concepts of social policy were criticized rhetorically, every single promise regarding what a 
sovereign Québec would be capable of still implied a strong state.141 Sovereignty was 
defined according to the following three criteria: (1) Québec should collect all taxes, (2) every 
law should be passed by the National Assembly, and (3) every international treaty should be 
negotiated by the Québec government and ratified by the National Assembly.142 Changes in 
the international context served as an argument that Québec needed full sovereignty to 
pursue its interests.143 Canada's consent was not seen as a prerequisite for independence 
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and the establishment of common institutions with the former mother country was restricted 
to the economic sphere.144
This radical stance was severely watered down during the referendum campaign. In the face 
of widespread fears, Parizeau accepted the necessity of proposing political union with 
Canada in order to ensure public support.145 Bloc Québécois leader Bouchard referred to the 
Maastricht treaty as an example of a future relationship between the two countries.146 Finally 
the original plan to declare sovereignty and then negotiate political union147 was reversed. As 
such, the referendum question was: "Do you agree that Québec should become sovereign 
after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership 
within the scope of the bill respecting the future of Québec and of the agreement signed on 
12 June 1995?".148 In spite of this modification, the unions and the "Partenaires pour la 
souveraineté" declared sovereignty the primary means to achieve social solidarity. In 
contrast with the PQ, whose political reforms linked to sovereignty consisted of a mere 
decentralization within Québec, these two organizations combined sovereignty with 
democratic reforms.149
The opposite camp was eager to make it clear that a No in the referendum would not mean 
satisfaction with the status quo (interview). Canadian federalism should be "flexibilized". 
Claiming that Québec could exercise more sovereignty within Canada than EU member 
states, the Liberals accused the PQ of having an "orthodox" understanding of sovereignty 
while hiding the main consequence of sovereignty: borders. A Yes in the referendum would 
mean the end of mobility for Québécois in Canada, Liberal leader Johnson declared.150 
Prime Minister Chrétien made it clear that a Yes would result in Canada treating Québec 
"just like every other foreign country".151
In sum, the role of the state was a salient issue in Québec's regionalist discourse. The 
specific corporatist tradition was used by the nationalist forces to mobilize the public for 
sovereignty. Yet the peaks of regionalist mobilization had less to do with the state's declining 
problem solving capacity. Rather it was the perceived refusal of the Canadian state to meet 
Québec's specific needs that led to upsurges of separatism. The corporatist political culture 
did nevertheless force the sovereigntists to link their primary goal to social reform which in 
turn require an active state. The only method with which they could convincingly promote 
sovereignty was to find functional arguments why full sovereignty was needed to pursue the 
common good. They had to insist on the policy-making capacities of nation-states. 
Consequently, they were torn between their aspirations and the actual loss of the state's 
problem-solving capacity. 
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5.5 Cultural Globalization, Identities and the 'Narcissism of Small Differences' 
If cultural globalization blurs national differences in culture, the desire for difference may be 
alternatively provided by smaller units. In order to probe the role of this causal pathway, the 
following questions need to be discussed. (1) Is there a growth of cultural events (theatre, 
exhibitions, film production) in the regional language and/or relating to the regional cultural 
tradition? (2) Does the circulation of regionally based newspapers and extent of regional TV 
programs increase? (3) How important is regional identity for regionalist propaganda? Is the 
regional collective identity defined according to ethnic, historical, linguistic or territorial 
criteria? (4) Do regionalists see the region's cultural identity as a response to 
homogenization in world culture? (5) Is it restricted to the region itself, does it reach out to 
trans-national or post-national collectivities and how is the "other" constructed? 
(a) Scotland: Although Britain imports fewer culturally relevant goods than other G 7 states, 
growth between 1970 ($ 457.4 million) and 1987 ($ 7303.9 million) is significant. Imports of 
newspapers and journals grew from $ 14.1 billion in 1970 to $ 230.7 billion in 1993. On 
British TV, the content produced outside the UK grew from 12.5% in 1973 to 17% in 1986.152 
Being a part of Britain, Scotland is inevitably exposed to a significant influx of cultural 
influences. It should be noted, however, that Scottish TV programs have increased as well 
and that the newspaper market is dominated by Scottish products.153 In this sense, cultural 
exposure to the world market has been responded to by an increase in the consumption of 
regional cultural goods. 
The existence of a distinct Scottish cultural identity has always been subject to debate. The 
widespread conviction that such a culture exists is based on a few myths which nonetheless 
reflect aspects of reality. There is hardly any distinct language to speak of (only 1-1.5% of the 
population speak Gaelic), but the cultivation of Scots, the dialect spoken North of the border, 
is definitely part of the collective identity. Scottish nationalism is said to have weak historical 
connections,154 but some elements of the collective identity are based on historical events 
which are interpreted in a specific way (the re-interpretation of the Act of Union as English 
conquest is one example). Another prominent myth is Scottish "collectivism", based on the 
radical tradition of the labour movement. Studies have actually revealed that collectivist 
values are shared by more people in Scotland than in England.155 Finally, the distinct 
institutional system including the Presbyterian Church, Scots Law, the educational system 
and especially the national football team have shaped Scottish identity and the awareness 
thereof to a great extent. 
For the SNP, Scottish identity has always been linked to the myths of collectivism and egali-
tarianism. The ethnic element has never been strong, although some people like ex-party 
leader Billy Wolfe tended to derive such values from the Celtic origins (another myth) of the 
Scottish people.156 At the same time, Scottish identity has hardly been exclusive, that is, 
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usually all people living in Scotland were included in the construction of the Scottish people. 
There were, however, certain fears that Scottish culture might be endangered by 
"uncontrolled immigration from England and elsewhere",157 but such factors never played a 
significant role in SNP policy. Their definition of Scotland has always been a territorial one. 
Scottish citizenship should be given to everyone living in Scotland at the time independence 
was achieved.158 Questions of cultural identity therefore never played a role in election 
campaigns of the seventies or the referendum debate of 1979. 
In the following years, cultural identity only played a role in SNP manifestos. The construction 
of identity was still inclusive, immigrants were seen as enriching Scottish society.159 History 
was used to mark Scotland's affinity towards the continent, pro-Europeanism thereby marked 
a central element of Scottish identity. At the same time, the anti-European bias of English 
politics was seen as isolating Scotland from Europe, and the "little Englanders" were 
accused of xenophobic tendencies.160 Scottish inferiority should be overcome by 
strengthening the European component of Scottish identity. Only the plans to support Gaelic 
by printing all official documents bilingually161 and increase the proportion of Scottish-made 
broadcasting programs to 40%162 seemed a little backward-looking, but they did not imply 
strict enforcement. On the whole, the party tried to appeal to the voters' emotions by 
accusing opponents of independence of being "anti-Scottish".163 The non-separatist wing of 
Scottish nationalism remained silent on this issue until the debate on a Scottish Parliament 
emerged again in the late eighties. Scottish culture was then seen in very similar terms as to 
those of the SNP. 
During the referendum campaign of 1997, the Yes-side clearly appealed to the emotional 
side of Scottish identity. Without explicitly marking elements of Scottishness, the campaign 
focused on "Scottish solutions, Scottish issues, Scottish priorities".164 The press, almost 
unanimously on the Yes-side, stressed the right to self-determination, while Scotland 
Forward and the SNP portrayed the No-side as the "same old anti-Scottish Right" (press 
releases). Such an emotional campaign was difficult for the unionists. They accused the Yes-
side of backwardness and "jingoism", calling their appeal to Scottish identity the "Braveheart-
campaign" which would endanger Scottish jobs. Such allegations of irrationality were again 
seen as an attack on Scottish self-confidence and identity, especially when they were picked 
up by Baroness Thatcher, one of the most unpopular people in Scotland.165 Hence, on 
referendum day, The Scotsman wrote that "those who would save Scotland from itself seem 
to think little of the Scots." Their attempt to appeal to a sense of Britishness also failed – not 
even the death of Princess Diana could mobilize pro-British sentiments.166 Finally, they 
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repeated the mistakes of the past by blaming Scottish politicians of being incapable of 
running the country and threatening that Scotland's share of the budget would be reduced. 
In sum, the development of Scottish identity reveals two interesting aspects. First, the 
perception of a distinct identity and a positive understanding thereof has definitely increased, 
as can be detected in polls.167 This development made it easier for the devolutionists to 
criticize the No-side for being anti-Scottish. Second, the Scottish collective identity seems to 
be compatible with cultural globalization. Although there is a growing consciousness of the 
Scottish past, while symbols such as the Kilt have reappeared in public life and a 
renaissance of Scottish literature, drama, music and arts can be detected,168 this 
development has by no means changed the openness of the Scottish collective identity 
construction. While the personal openness is rooted in the widespread myth of collectivism, 
the easy incorporation of a European component was made still easier by the former dual 
identity of being Scottish and British. 
(b) Québec: There is no doubt that the French language is the key element of Québécois 
identity. Before the Quiet Revolution the past, it was used by the clerical elites to "protect" 
the population from secularized influences on the continent.169 After the Second World War, 
the construction of identity started to change from "French Canadians" to Québécois", while 
the territorial component increasingly replaced the religious focus.170 The struggle over the 
language has always dominated the debate and shaped the cleavage against English 
speaking Canada. Within the political elite, there is a consensus that there is a Francophone 
nation represented by the sovereign government of Québec. The main cultural difference 
with Canada is the relationship between individual and group rights. For the Québécois, 
Canada consists of several communities whose rights have to be protected. They never 
shared, therefore, the "Canadian dream" of a society based on individual rights.171 Although 
this view changed with the Quiet Revolution, the cleavage between individual rights and the 
defence of Québec's cultural identity remains on the agenda. The question arises of whether 
the aggravated fight for Québécois culture has to do with cultural globalization and how far 
the perception thereof has changed qualitatively. Data is difficult to find. On the one hand, 
Canada has one of the highest shares of culturally relevant imports in the Western world.172 
On the other hand, Québec's imports are mainly from Francophone countries and, hence, 
used to support the development of Québécois culture.173
The traditional definition of Québécois identity, as it was represented by the PQ and 
predecessors, was at least in part an ethnic one. The PQ believed that every people 
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possesses a "collective personality" which has to be looked after.174 In the political debate, 
the main issue remained the French language and its protection from assimilation. Right from 
the beginning, the PQ promised to make French the only official language.175 Especially after 
electoral defeats, the party tended to polarize between linguistic groups, blaming the 
"Anglophone block" for preventing the majority from living up to their needs.176 Over the 
years, immigration policy became another element of the battle for the Francophone culture. 
The fact that immigrants preferred to send their children to Anglophone schools caused the 
PQ to propose laws forcing them to be educated in French. 
After their election in 1976, one of the first moves of the Lévesque government was to pass a 
law to protect the French language. The party was split on this issue,177 but the 
assimilationist wing striving for the forced assimilation of immigrants was in the lead when Bill 
101 was passed. The referendum debate was dominated by cultural issues; the Lévesque 
government declared the equality of Francophones the main reason for sovereignty-
association. Historical events such as the 1763 law excluding Francophones from public 
service were dug out to show how disadvantaged Francophones had always been. Canada's 
extension to the West was portrayed as an anti-Francophone conspiracy intended to turn 
them into a minority.178 This demographic threat was a cornerstone of the PQ's line of 
argument in the referendum campaign. Although the Liberals shared many points,179 this led 
to a polarization along the linguistic cleavage. Almost every single non-Francophone in the 
province, including the native peoples, voted against sovereignty-association.180 While the 
PQ tried to avoid any ethnic definition of the Québec nation, they effectively did so by 
constructing the collective identity along linguistic lines and historical developments. 
After the lost referendum, the integrationist wing within the PQ gained influence. Nationalism 
was modernized and deprived of some authoritarian elements. The fear that the 
Francophone culture might be undermined, however, remained.181 For Québec's political 
elites, the failure of the Meech Lake Accord was but one more backlash against the 
Francophone community within Canada. The rejection of the distinct society clause was the 
main motive for the strengthening of Québec nationalism in the aftermath of Meech Lake. 
Parizeau stated that the fact that Canada had remained united over such a long period was 
obviously the result of a misunderstanding. While Québec had always thought that Canada 
was comprised of two founding nations, English Canada considered the country to consist of 
ten equal provinces.182 Within the PQ, the integrationist wing lost influence; a proposal to 
allow bilingual signs again was turned down at a party convention.183
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No other topic took more room in the debates and the final report of the Bélanger-Campeau 
Commission than Québec's culture. Québec's identity, not only defined by language, but also 
by the province's former achievements and international presence, was considered to be 
endangered within the Canadian federation. The Commission stated that it was obviously 
impossible to reconcile the Québécois and Canadian identities, visions and aspirations within 
the framework of Canadian federation.184 The conclusion was clear: either Québec would get 
full sovereignty in all culturally relevant areas and a right to veto in constitutional affairs, or 
separation was inevitable.185 The PQ and the unions went further still, and declared that 
Québec could live up to her "personality" as a sovereign part of "global village".186 The 
international context was explicitly referred to as a better framework to protect Québec's 
culture. 
While the main concern of the Commission had been Canada's rejection of the Francophone 
culture, the referendum debate was again shaped by attempts to positively define Québec's 
identity. The PQ program was torn between civic and ethnic definitions; the 1991 program 
defines Québécois as being Francophones. In 1993, Parizeau declared that independence 
could only be achieved with the support of the "Québécois de souche".187 At the same time, 
the party tried to appear open and tolerant by stressing the rights of the Anglophone minority, 
whilst insisting that French was the main vehicle of Québec's cultural identity. Admitting that 
no culture could survive without external influences, the PQ made it clear that Québec's 
culture was Francophone. A sovereign Québec could profit from co-operating with other 
Francophone states and immigrants would make a clear decision to go to a Francophone 
country.188
The trade unions, traditionally critical of free trade, were able to relate their arguments to the 
dangers of increased trade for Québec's culture.189 They also stressed other elements, par-
ticularly the corporatist structures and "collectivist" values, which were said to be incompati-
ble with neo-liberal free trade ideology.190 With regard to the cultural-nationalist organizations 
such as the Société St. Jean-Baptiste and the Mouvement National des Québécoises et 
Québécois, Canadian constitutional history remained the principal threat. Still, they also 
referred to cultural globalization, arguing that in the face of uncontrolled trade, efforts should 
be stepped up maintain Québec's "exclusively French" character.191 The latter was also seen 
to be endangered by the immigration of Anglophones and other non-French-speaking 
groups. Therefore, they demanded legal guarantees that immigrants be integrated into the 
Francophone community (Conley 1997: 78).192 In addition, they wanted French to be the only 
language of instruction in Québec's schools, with English lessons beginning at the higher 
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grade, and to improve students' knowledge of Québécois history in order to develop a 
"culture publique commune".193
The PQ shared some of the above anxieties. The globalization of the media and cultural 
markets as well as migration were seen to undermine the cohesion of national cultures and 
spaces.194 In their view, national cultures were still necessary to lead societies; even 
economic strategies would not make sense without a "cultural plan".195 On the other hand, 
the party still tried to portray globalization as a chance to strengthen Québec's culture and to 
develop a positive image of open-mindedness.196 Parizeau defined the increasing exchange 
of information and culture as a chance to present Québec to the world.197 According to 
Québec's Minister of Culture, growing interdependence leads to an increasing demand for 
cultural affirmation and recognition amongst countries and peoples. Having subjected its own 
cultural market to Americanization, English Canada would not be able to understand such 
aspirations.198
However, all the attempts to endow Québec nationalism with such an image of open-
mindedness were undermined when some prominent nationalists made inept comments. For 
example, one Bloc Québécois politician declared that only people of French descent would 
qualify as Québécois; another one wanted to deprive immigrants of their right to vote in the 
referendum (Conley 1997: 80). The cultural-nationalist organizations took the most radical 
position on the language issue. They even criticized the fact that the referendum question did 
not include proposals for language regulation in a sovereign Québec. According to their 
perspective, sovereignty was primarily a means to protect Québec's culture (Conley 1997: 
78). Their construction of identity was primarily based on descent: "Les Québécois partagent 
une histoire, une culture et une langue: le français".199 Such definitions, however, exposed 
the nationalist camp to allegations of being ethnically minded or even racist. In this case, the 
debates surrounding the situation of linguistic minorities proved to be the nationalists' biggest 
problem. Their organizations stayed away from the public hearings, thereby further 
undermining the legitimacy of the pre-referendum proceedings. The nationalists were in a 
Catch-22 position: "In case the PQ government ignores the existence of such minorities, it is 
accused of being assimilationist. If it does, it is accused of making differences and 
discrimination" (interview). 
Despite the nationalists' problems in this issue area, it also proved to be their strongest 
asset. No one could afford to downplay the defence of the Francophone culture, and even 
the Liberals considered the language to be the "heart" of it.200 Therefore, the bilingual 
cleavage remained the crucial one. The separatists' gains compared to 1980 were only made 
amongst the Francophone population, 60% of whom voted Yes, while 95% of those speaking 
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other languages at home voted No.201 This reflects a significant change in the Québécois' 
definitions of collective identities. In 1970, only 21% of the Francophone population 
considered themselves Québécois, while 44% thought of themselves as Canadiens français 
and 34% as Canadiens. The latter option had already dropped to 14% in 1979, with 37% 
seeing themselves as Québécois. In 1990, the proportions had changed completely: 59% of 
the Francophones identified themselves as Québécois, 28% as Canadiens français and only 
9% as Canadiens.202 Hence, identification with Québec rose significantly. It is quite 
interesting to see that this process went hand in hand with the modernization of the identity 
construction and increasing openness of Québec's society to external influences. One may 
interpret these findings as support for the "narcissism of small differences". However, the PQ 
has so far been unable to effectively use the changing international environment to mobilize 
a majority in favour of sovereignty. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Globalization offers new opportunities for regionalist mobilization by reducing risks of and 
creating new incentives for regionalism. However, this seems to be only true if the regionalist 
movement in question displays certain characteristics. A successful economy and a form of 
regionalism that is self-confident enough to feel prepared to act in a global environment are 
the most important features of successful regionalism in a globalized world. Only such 
regionalist movements can take advantage of the new opportunity structures by adapting to 
the new environment. As both cases discussed above reveal, this adaptability does not 
simply depend on political entrepreneurs' strategies, but proves to be highly path-dependent 
and lies in the history and the economic success of the region. At the same time, the cases 
of Scotland and Québec demonstrate that the new opportunity structure can be utilized for 
quite different political programs. In the context of globalization, regionalism must not 
necessarily be neo-liberal in nature, aiming at reducing obligations towards weaker regions. 
The new opportunity structures can also work in favour of leftist or collectivist regionalisms as 
long as there is a sufficiently strong economic base. 
The most obvious impact of globalization on the regionalist discourse can be found in the 
economic sphere. In both cases, regionalists were able to use the reduced risk of losing 
markets to their own advantage. The comparison, however, shows that the character of the 
market-maintaining international institution matters: the European Common Market seems to 
be more convincing than a mere trade agreement such as NAFTA. The PQ had more 
difficulties in convincing the public that market access was secure than the devolutionists in 
Scotland. While in Canada the nation-state still promises more economic security, this 
function has been taken over to a certain degree by the EU in Scotland. 
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Regional or endogenous development strategies can support regionalist mobilization 
especially in regions whose political tradition differs from the national one. One important 
precondition is the relative success of such strategies. Both Scotland and Québec have 
caught up economically because their strategies of corporatist concertation proved to be 
more coherent. Since regionalist actors could easily refer to globalization here, they can be 
regarded as regionally specific responses to the challenges of globalization. Success also 
implies a further precondition: relative wealth proved to be important for extending the 
support base for regionalism. As opposed to the seventies, protagonists of regionalism 
avoided portraying the regional economy as weak. Instead, they stressed the endogenous 
potential which could only be developed if strategies were employed at the appropriate level. 
It is wrong to assume that in the age of globalization regionalism is necessarily a welfare 
regionalism based on neo-liberal ideology. It is true, however, that economic success is a 
pre-requisite for successful regionalist movements. This is different from earlier times. 
Legitimacy crises could be detected in the UK and Canada, although both were seen and 
protrayed as home-made, rather than induced by globalization. In Scotland, the widespread 
support for devolution was a clear rebuttal of the neo-liberal withdrawal of the state, which 
can, in a certain way, be portrayed as both a driving force and a result of globalization.203 As 
in Québec, the legitimacy of the state was further undermined by centralization. Therefore, 
one of the main arguments for devolution was that a Scottish Parliament could protect 
Scotland against such neo-liberal policies. Regionalism does indeed arise against the 
background of a perceived crisis of the nation-state. However, the perception of crisis must 
not necessarily result from too much state and regulation for dealing with the challenges of 
globalization. It can equally be the result of too much neo-liberalism, as in Britain, or too 
much of the status quo, as in Italy. Today's regionalism is characterized by a new opportunity 
structure and seems to be wide open with respect to its ideological connotations. 
The main difference between the two cases in question lies in the fact that Scottish 
nationalists explicitly refer to European multi-level governance, while the PQ wants to reduce 
the number of political levels. Their arguments against Canadian federalism resemble those 
of the British Tories against devolution and supranational integration. These patterns of 
argument are based on a traditional understanding of sovereignty which is less compatible 
with the complex situation induced by globalization. While in the PQ case this is definitely a 
reaction to Canada's unwillingness to acknowledge Québec's needs, the comparison shows 
that people can be more easily convinced of political decentralization in cases where an 
external support system such as the EU exists. Even unpopular nation-states still promise 
more protection than states-to-be, which means that the significance of the nation-state has 
not declined as much as the debate on globalization, at times, implies. Yet national 
sovereignty loses importance wherever governance systems beyond the nation-state turn out 
to be functional. In such cases, regional nationalists do not need to continue waving the 
sovereignty flag, which seems to place them in conflict with reality. 
Regional cultural identities can be both a mobilizing factor and an obstacle to modernization. 
Although there was scant evidence that globalization is seen as a threat to the regional 
cultural identity, this does not necessarily negate our argument. The underlying mechanism 
is rather a subconscious one, and explicitly negative reactions to other cultures have a 
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negative connotation in Western democracies. While the correlation between cultural 
globalization and growing identification with Scotland and Québec is obvious, the increased 
cultural exchange not only leads to defensiveness, but regionalist actors also regard it as a 
chance to strengthen the regional cultural identity internally by presenting it externally. The 
Scots were more successful in this regard than the Québécois, although cultural factors play 
a much more important role in the latter case, where the Francophone culture is perceived to 
be under threat. It is precisely this strong bilingual cleavage that has been the main obstacle 
to developing a convincing modern and open-minded construction of Québécois identity. The 
perceived threat leads to an increased desire to mark off one's own cultural identity against 
others. In the case of Québec, this led to polarization and even alarmed members of the 
Francophone community. 
A collective identity that does not include traces of ethnic criteria of belonging can obviously 
mobilize broader segments of the population for regionalist goals. In Scotland, the 
boundaries are territorial and institutional, which means that every person who lives within 
the country can be won for a regionalist project. Again, the Scots do not face the same 
problems as the Québécois. Immigrants, for example, do not have the choice to associate 
with another linguistic group, which is seen as a threat to the Francophone (on the Canadian 
scale: minority) culture and in turn increases assimilationist tendencies. The Scottish identity 
construction is as path-dependent as the Québécois. Having joined the UK voluntarily 
provided for a dual identity in which the "British" part is now increasingly replaced by a 
European part. In Québec, the development of the collective identity construction took the 
opposite direction, from Canadien français to the one-dimensional Québécois, which still 
includes exclusive elements. Again, it can be stated that the content of today's regionalism is 
not pre-determined by the new opportunity structure, but that we can observe quite different 
types of regionalism along the dimensions of inclusion and exclusion. 
The comparison of these two cases shows that the impact of globalization on regionalism is 
as uneven and diverse as the process itself. It can strengthen regionalism through the 
changes it induces in the economic, political and cultural spheres. An optimistic conclusion of 
our comparison could be that regionalists with an inclusive identity construction who see 
themselves as part of a complex form of governance beyond the nation-state, and are able to 
link their claims to promising regional development concepts, should be more successful in 
the long run. However, whether regionalists are able to take advantage of these new 
opportunity structures is highly path-dependent. The main factors, such as economic 
development potential, inclusiveness of the regional or national identity construction or 
understandings of sovereignty which are compatible with societal and political 
denationalization, are not born overnight. On the contrary, economic potential and 
conceptions, political culture and collective identities usually need a long time to develop. 
Taken together with the strategies regionalist actors need to develop, these diverse 
prerequisites for successful regionalist mobilization suggest that there is no simple recipe for 
successful regionalism - which is not a completely surprising result. The impact of 
globalization on regionalism - and thereby the challenge of the nation-state - is and will 
remain quite asymmetric. 
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